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ABSTRACT
The Boston Housing Partnership was'formed in late 1982 to address the
rental housing crisis that had surfaced in Boston by the early 1980's.
The Partnership seeks to prpmote, organize, and manage programs that
can salvage declining and abandoned housing and convert it into de-
cent, affordable housing for low and moderate income families. Their
first effort, a Demonstration program, began in late 1983. The Partner-
ship will rehabilitate 700 units of deteriorated and abandoned housing
across the city. This work is being accomplished through ten com-
munity based sponsors who will develop, own, and manage these units.
This thesis first looks at the economic, social, and political con-
ditions that gave rise to the Partnership. Second, the Demonstration
Program is briefly described and a short profile of each sponsor is
provided. Third, the financing model used is described. Lastly,
the implementation of the Demonstration program is analyzed.
The experience of the Demonstration program has shown that these
"public-private" partnership responses to the recent federal cutbacks
in housing assistance are extremely complex. They require a large
number of actors to aggregate multiple sources of assistance. Such
complexity has proven to be both extremely time consuming and expen-
sive. The lessons learned in the Demonstration program should prove
to be instructive to future "public-private" housing solutions.
Thesis Supervisor: Professor Philip L. Clay
Title: Associate Professor of Urban Studies and Planning
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II. The Context: The Origins of the Partnership
The following section provides an analysis of the economic, social,
and political context that contributed to the creation of the Boston
Housing Partnership. By 1982, a number of factors converged to help
spawn the Partnership. The following analysis will look at the rental
supply/demand imbalance, the low vacancy rate, and the resultant
"affordability" crisis that appeared by late 1982. We will also examine
the City of Boston's response, the creation of Goals for Boston, the
local political scene, and the role of Greater Boston Community
Development.
Boston's Housing Market
By late 1982, it was apparent that Boston was experiencing a dire
shortage of rental units in decent conditions that low and moderate
income households could afford.
Supply
Rental housing has long been the backbone of Boston's housing stock.
Over 70% of the city's housing units are rental units -- one of the
highest rental rates in the country. Seventy eight percent (78%) of
these units are in multi-family structures (i.e., two or more units) and
153% are in large apartments (i.e., five or more units).
While the supply of rental housing remained relatively stable during
the 1970's, the early 1980's signaled a significant shift. Many of the
losses of 1-4 family units (primarily due to demolition) were replaced
by a gain of 22,000 new subsidized units built during the 70's.2
Since 1980, however, there has been a marked loss of available
rental housing. Between 1980 and 1983, approximately 9,000 new
condominiums were created from the existing rental stock. Around 60%
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of these conversions occurred outside the downtown area in areas such
as the Fenway and Allston-Brighton.3
Additions to the housing stock have not been sufficient to compensate
for the loss of affordable rental housing. In October of 1983, the
Boston Redevelopment Authority published a report that claimed Boston
should be producing around 2,800 new low and moderate income units each
year to accomodate new households and replace existing stock. New
subsidized housing construction during 1980-1984 accomplished 17% of
that goal (1,950/11,200). When one adds rehabilitated subsidized units,
only 35% of the target has been met.5
Demand
The number of renters over the past decade has stayed relatively stable,
but their characteristics have changed dramatically. As Boston has become
an attractive location for upwardly mobile professionals, there has been
an increased demand for luxury rentals. These new households tend to be
younger, smaller (1-2 persons) and more affluent than traditional renters.
At the same time, however, Boston's rental housing stock continues to
serve predominantly a population with limited incomes. Median household
income in 1980 was only $10,410.6 Approximately 54% of Boston's families
are eligible for subsidized housing. These low and moderate income renters
are increasingly forced to compete with the new affluent for a limited
number of available units. This added pressure has compounded the supply
problem.
Vacancy
The upshot of these supply and demand trends is an extremely low
vacancy rate in an extremely tight market. While a vacancy rate of 5%
is often indicative of a reasonable balance between supply and demand,
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Boston's rate is significantly below. The rate varies depending on the
source. Based on deccenial Census enumeration, the 1980 vacancy rate
was 2.8%; 6 the Rental Housing Association listed a vacancy rate of 2.46%
in October of 1983; and the U.S. Postal Service Housing Vacancy reported
2.0% in February of 1984.8 While the numbers vary, each suggests a clear
trend of limited rental vacancies.
Affordability
Increased demand for a limited supply, of course, has led to increased
rents. According to the most recent Annual Housing Survey, median contract
rents rose 44% between 1977 and 1981.9 The Rental Housing Association's
Fall 1983 survey shows rents for available vacancies concentrated in the
$400+ range, with over 25% at $600+.10 Emily Achtenberg, in June of 1984,
produced a survey of BostonGloba listings for the first quarter of 1984.
Median rent was $528, with over 35% renting for $600+.ll
Tenant incomes, however, have clearly not kept pace with tenant's
abilities to afford rents. This has resulted in what many have called
an "affordability crisis." Between 1977 and 1981, while rents rose
48% (55% in non-subsidized units) tenant incomes rose only 35%.12
For low and moderate income renters, the problems became severe. While
only 2-6% of vacancies available in early 1984 rent for less than $300
per month, an estimated 44% of Boston's renters needed apartments under
$300 if they were to spend no more than 30% of their incomes for rent.
City wide, only 30-35% of all renter households could afford the median
rent by early 1984.13
The City's Response
By late 1982, the City had begun to take a serious look at some of
these problems. The Neighborhood Development and Employment Agency
9
(NDEA) produced a document entitled "Multi-Family Housing in Boston:
Issues and Options." 4
The paper acknowledged that there was "a substantial rental housing
problem in Boston -- a dire shortage of rental units in decent condition
that low and moderate income households can afford."15 They noted,
however, that there was no shortage of under-utilized, poorly maintained
or abandoned buildings, which if rehabilitated, could contribute to
satisfying the needs of low and moderate income renters.
Many of these investor owned non-subsidized buildings were of five
or more units. The greatest number were also found in Roxbury, the
Fenway/South End, and North Dorchester. The highest number of vacant
buildings were found in Roxbury, Franklin Field, North Dorchester, and
the South End/Lower Roxbury. Approximately 30% of the City's housing
stock was located in these larger structures and 11,300 (out of 69,200)
units were in need of rehabilitation.16 Owners were reluctant to invest
in this multi-family housing, they pointed out, because of a combination
of high financing costs,rapidly increasing operating and construction
costs, and lagging rents.
Past City housing programs attacked the problems of owner occupied,
one to six family housing, but left the needs of the larger buildings
untouched. According to Tim Pattison, the assistant director of NDEA's
research and policy development division through 1984, the first five
years of the Block Grant program (1975-1980) provided 20% rebates to over
18,000 1-3 family units. The needs of the largermulti-unit structure,
he claims, were not being adequately addressed by the City.
The report went on to state that "the economics of construction and
rehabilitation make it increasingly difficult for the private sector to
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meet virtually any portion of the need for moderately-priced rental
housing."17 While the 1970's saw 22,000 new subsidized units to
compensate for the lack of private development (only 3.100 units in the
private sector), the reductions and elimination of the major federal
subsidy programs put an end to that activity.
The report concluded:
A major new initiative is called for that could creatively
combine CDBG, state, and private funds with other
philanthropic contributions and in-kind services. It is not
an initiative that the city can undertake alone. 'It calls for
a partnership between the City, financial institutions,
foundations, state agencies, and a variety of community
organizations. (my emphasis)1 -~
This set the stage for what would later become the Boston Housing
Partnership.
The Rise of Goals for Boston
Simultaneous to the NDEA's efforts to establish such a "partnership",
were the efforts of a group known as Goals for Boston. Goals for Boston
was established by the Chairman and President of State Street Bank and
Trust Company, William S. Edgerly. This consortorium of public officials,
private business lenders, and representatives of neighborhood organizations,
was called together in 1980 by Edgerly to "define and support positive
achievable goals for the city during the next five years,"19 The Goals
for Boston idea was part of larger national movement involving numerous
business leaders. In February of 1982, the Committee for Economic
Development (CED), a consortium of business officials from around the
country, published a book entitled Public-Private Partnerships: An
. .20
Opportunity for Urban Communities. Edgerly was extremely active in this
effort aimed at encouraging partnerships in cities across the US, to help
address the economic development needs of urban America, Edgerly's work on the
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CED effort inspired him to start a Goals for Boston effort aimed at
building new coalitions.
Goals for Boston originally targetted education, race relations, and
jobs as its three areas for action. Although housing was not high on
Edgerly's list of priorities, several members of Goals for Boston active
in the housing sector, pushed to make housing a major focus.
One of these members was David Mundel, then head of the City's NDEA.
Mundel was no stranger to either Edgerly or the "public- private
partnership" idea. Together, Edgerly and Mundel had been the chief
architects of the Boston Private Industry Council (PIC). The success of
the Boston PIC, it is thought by many, provided the model for the
structuring of PIC's in the Job Training Partnership Act of the early
1980's. With this experience under their belt, Mundel and Edgerly
moved their efforts into the housing sector.
The Local Political Climate
The rise of Goals for Boston and the Boston Housing Partnership was
also fueled by local political and economic factors. During the 1970's
Boston had begun to experience unprecedented growth and development
in the downtown area. By the early 1980's, however, Mayor Kevin White's
administration was being scrutinized by many who saw this growth occuring
at the expense of the neighborhoods. Indeed, many claimed a causal
link between downtown development and the housing crisis. The new
affluent "non-traditional" renters desiring proximity to downtown jobs
were pushing up demand and pitting low and moderate income households
against the new urban professionals.
The result was twofold. First, "Linkage" became a buzzword in the
media as housing advocates called for a tax on downtown office development
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to create a "Housing Trust" that could help meet the neighborhood's
housing needs. Second, there was a strong push for business prospering
from the downtown boom to "share the wealth" with the neighborhoods.
Goals for Boston was in part, an effort to respond to those calls.
The Federal Government
Against this backdrop, the "public-private partnership" was becoming
a major component of national urban policy. The Carter administration,
from 1978-1980, had advocated for a new public-private interface to
leverage private investment in economically distressed areas. The Urban
Development Action Grant Program (UDAG) was one of the major initiatives
developed during this time.
The Reagan administration found the public-private partnership concept
quite palatable -- particularly if it served to reduce the role of the
federal government in fighting social ills in economically distressed
areas. Recent federal cutbacks in housing assistance programs were
accompanied by an espoused confidence that the private sector would
mobilize to meet the needs previously met by government spending.
As part of a larger effort to cut government spending, the Reagan
administration cutback the Section 8 New Construction and Substantial
Rehabilitation program and the associated GNMA Tandem program. This
fallout has left a gap that has since remained. As the NDEA "Issues and
Options" paper noted, "without the subsidies provided in these programs,
the rehabilitation of existing structures and construction of new
housing for low and moderate income housholds is generally not feasible."
2 1
In short, the fallout of the federal government from housing
assistance created a gap that the Partnership attempted to fill.
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The Role of Community Based Sponsors
Although Edgerly and Mundel had a fairly detailed analysis of the
housing problem, they had only a vague notion about what the partnership
solution would entail. Early in 1983, however, Pat Clancy, director of
Greater Boston Community Development (GBCD) began working closely with
Edgerly to set out the framework for the Partnership.
GBCD is a non-profit housing development and consulting firm. They
were originally incorporated in 1964 as South- End Community Development
(SECD) and gained expertise in developing three decker row houses in
Boston's South End. They later expanded, took on a regional scope, and
shifted to providing development assistance. They have assisted in
developing over 2,000 new units for low and moderate income people in the
Metropolitan area and manage over 700 units. Under Clancy's guidance,
GBCD also became known as the pioneer in the syndication of low income
housing.
The Partnership Board
The Boston Housing Partnership was formed as a non-profit corporation
early in 1983. A 23 member board was picked by Edgerly (with the
assistance of Clancy). The board consisted of six bank presidents, four
representatives of community-based organizations, three state housing
officials, three City housing officials, and representatives from
insurance, law, real estate, and universities. (see Appendix for a
complete list of board members.)
Goals of the Partnership
The Partnership set forth some fairly general goals:
-to promote, organize, and manage programs that can salvage
declining and abandoned housing and convert it into decent,
affordable housing for low and moderate income families.
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-mobilize funding and other resources from the business
community and government agencies for neighborhood-based
organizations so the public and private sectors attack
housing problems jointly.
-provide technical assistance to community-based sponsors
of low and moderate income housing to enhanye their
capabilities to develop and manage housing.
The repeated emphasis on "community based sponsors" is no accident.
Boston has a rich network of community based housing development
organizations. Community based housing had its origins in the 1960's
when the first successful community development corporation (CDC) in
Boston, Inquilinos Boriucas en Accion (Puerto Rican Tenants in Action)
formed in 1967 to protest potential displacement of urban renewal. IBA
was later named developer of Parcel 19 by the BRA and has since developed
over 800 units. There are approximately 20 other CDC's in Boston.
Clancy, from early on in structuring the Partnership, served as an
effective advocate for community based housing sponsorship. While many
were initially hesitant to limit the program to non-profit developers,
GBCD's experience in the non-profit or "community based housing sponsor"
field, eventually convinced them that non-profit developers could handle
the tasks of a demonstration program more efficiently than private
developers. Thus, the exclusive use of non-profit developers became an
integral part of the Boston Housing Partnership.
Institutional Changes
In addition to community based sponsorship, the Partnership took on a
second goal. To facilitate the transfer of ownership to community
sponsors and to lessen development costs, the Partnership Board decided to
simplify and speed up the process for the city to foreclose on properties
with significant tax arrears and to abate most of the tax debt where the
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owner was willing to sell to community sponsors. In the past, community
groups trying to rehabilitate tax-title or tax delinquent properties had
experienced many problems. With approximately 15 different city
agencies involved in an uncoordinated manner, the foreclosure process
could take up to two years. A major goal of the Partnership therefore was
to simplify and shorten the process of foreclosing.
In situations where the buildings to be rehabilitated were in tax
arrearage and the owner was willing to sell to a community sponsor, the
Partnership hoped to facilitate direct transfer of ownership with tax
abatements. This would avoid the need for the city to take over the
building and was possible through Chapter 8, Section 8 of the
Massachusetts General Laws, which requires that the city assessor recommend
to the state revenue department that these abatements be made.
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III. The Demonstration Program
The first task taken on by the Boston Housing Partnership is the
Multi-Family, or Demonstration Program. The program will rehabilitate
700 units of deteriorated and abandoned housing and maintain it as
housing for primarily low and moderate income households. The Demonstration
Program targetted declining and abandoned properties not likely to be
restored by private market forces. Community based organizations were
solicited in late 1983 to identify suitable buildings, obtain site
control, and submit applications to the Partnership to develop and manage
the housing.
The Partnership hired GBCD to design the Demonstration Program and
to develop the financing details. Bonnie Heudorfer, the first executive
director of the Partnership, was "loaned" to the BHP by the Bank of
Boston, where she is a Community Investment Officer. She coordinated the
Demonstration program during the initial six month planning period
(February-August 1983).
In August, 1983, the BHP issued a Request for Proposals announcing
the Demonstration program to non-profit, community based sponsors. The
proposal contained a 36 page application and a 56 page program handbook
describing the Demonstration Program. Applications were due on October
31, 1983. GBCD's services were made available free of charge to assist in
tasks such as identifying buildings, negotiating purchase prices and
site control, and identifying a development and management team.
The major provisions of the RFP included:
-A total of 500 units would be funded
-Projects should be from 30-100 units in size
-Projects should include buildings which, on average, could be
acquired and rehabilitated for approximately $26,000 per unit.
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In addition, projects were encouraged to include properties with tax
and utility arrearages; projects were allowed $4,500 per unit for other
development expenses, such as architectural and engineering studies, legal
fees, and consultants; buildings were required to meet all city and
state, zoning, sanitary, and building codes.
In total, the Partnership received applications from fourteen community-
based organizations for a total of 1061 units. Two proposals (East
Boston CDC and the Roxbury Action Program) were rejected due to lack of
feasibility and site selection. The remaining twelve sponsors received
authorization in December for a total of 800 units, up from the 500 units
originally announced. Two groups eventually withdrew their applications,
bringing the total down to 700 units. The South Boston CDC's community
objected to the affirmative marketing requirements of the program, and
Nuestra Communidad objected to the Partnership's rejection of what they
thought was a key building from their project.
Sponsors
The ten sponsors selected are detailed in the following section, along
with some information about the buildings they are rehabilitating. 2 3
Allston-Brighton Community Development Corporation
Board of Directors that includes representatives of all major
neighborhood and civic organizations concerned with Allston-
Brighton
Rehabilitated old school building for moderate income
(condominium) homeownership (10 units)
On-going organizing and outreach to Indo-Chinese community
Under BHP program will rehabilitate 1-39 Hano Street in Allston
to provide 10 two-bedroom and 10 three-bedroom units
Fenway Community Development Corporation
Participated as a limited partner in the rehabilitation of 100
units in 10 vacant buildings on Westland Avenue using Section 8
Substantial Rehabilitation, syndication, and an Urban Development
Action Grant
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Awarded HUD Cycle V Solar Energy Demonstration Grant for
installation of residential solar systems in the Fenway
Rehabing a large surplus city building and Edgerly playground
Under BHP, will rehabilitate 20 units at 69-71 Westland Avenue
Fields Corner Community Development Corporation
Constructed 8 prefabricated homes on empty lots with a number
of public financing schemes
Involved in the development of One Acadia Place, a mixed use
development combining office and commercial space with housing,
financed through a $340,000 Urban Development Action Grant
Under BHP program, rehabbing 76 units in 6 buildings:
1396 Dorchester Avenue
110-112 Park Street
1-3 Josephine Street
38 Leroy Street
12 Arcadia Street
460-462 Geneva Avenue
Lena Park Community Development Corporation
Oldest community development corporation participating in
the Demonstration Program, established in 1968.
Has largest operating budget of any sponsor in Partnership
Rehabilitated 8 houses on Franklin Street using CDBG
Involved in a number of direct social service projects, including
youth activities and administration of Orchard Park Neighborhood
House and Recreation Center
Under BHP will rehab 93 units in 11 buildings:
69 Glenway Street
20 Fowler Street
53-55 Glenway Street
3-5 Esmond Street
102-112 Talbot Avenue
1310 Blue Hill Avenue
5-15 Fessenden Avenue
31-31A Fessenden Avenue
4 Wellington Hill Street
Codman Square Community Development Corporation
Developed Norfolk Terrace Apartments for low-income senior
citizen housing (17 units)
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Working to put a number of Dorchester buildings into a
National Historic District
Under BHP will rehabilitate 12 buildings totalling 80 units:
7 Capen Street
225-227 Norfolk Street
554 Washington Street
115 Maxwell Street
119 Maxwell Street
24 Crowell Street
1749 Dorchester Avenue
1757 Dorchester Avenue
3 Gaylord Street
706-708 Washington Street
- 710-728 Washington Street
26-28 Thane Street
Dorchester Bay Economic Development Corporation
Began as a conglomeration of three neighborhood civic associations
(Savin Hill, Jones Hill, and Virginia-Monadnock)
Manages an Urban Homesteading program focusing on rehabilitating
blighted and abandoned housing (15 units)
Rehabilitated a two- and three-unit building and sold buildings
back to the occupants
Tentatively designated developer of Pierce Building in Uphams
Corner, Dorchester for mixed-use development
Preserved neighborhood open space by creating the
Virginia/Monadnock Park
Under BHP, will rehabilitate 58 units in 5 buildings:
14-15 Roach Street
20-24 Roach Street
1285-1291 Massachusetts Avenue
2-12 Dudley Terrace
1125-1129 Dorchester Aveneu
Mission Hill Neighborhood Housing Services
Provides technical and financial resources to neighborhood
homeowners and tenants
Rehabilitated 6 units for elderly housing using Chapter 707
program
Administers Section 8 Existing housing (40 units) for Boston
Housing Authority
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Under BHP, will rehabilitate 74 units in 5 buildings:
7-17 Delle Avenue
56 Delle Avenue
7 Frawley Street
11 Frawley Street
15 Frawley Street
Quincy-Geneva Housing Development Corporation
Board of Representatives includes representatives from
Stanwood Street Block Association and the Roxbury Multi-Service
Center
Roxbury Multi-service Center has administered an Urban
Homesteading program (9 units)
Roxbury Multi-service Center offers wide array of service programs,
such as youth job training, housing information and referral
and neighborhood activities
Stanwood Street Block Association has organized successful
Neighborhood Crime Watch to deal with arson and vandalism
Newest sponsor in demonstration program (incorporated in 1983);
only sponsor without at least one paid, full-time staff person
Under BHP, will rehabilitate 101 units in 10 buildings:
200-204 Columbia Road
94-96 Intervale Street
42 Holborn Street
90 Stanwood Street
96 Stanwood Street
36-38 Normandy Street
538-544 Warren Street
229 Columbia Road
564-568 Warren Street
572-572A Warren/1-3 Intervale/40-50 Brunswick Streets
Roxbury-North Dorchester Neighborhood Revitalization Corporation
Extensive program of housing counseling for low-income
neighborhood residents, funded through CDBG
Rehabilitating a three-unit abandoned building with mortgage
loan from local bank
Under BHP, will rehabilitate 96 units in 6 buildings:
2029-2037 Columbus Avenue
2041-2049 Columbus Avenue
25 Wyoming Street
39 Wyoming Street
185-187 Walnut Avenue
189-191 Walnut Avenue
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Urban Edge, Inc.
Most experienced group in housing rehabilitation
Only sponsor with "in-house" staff of designers, architects
and building managers
Has rehabilitated average of 100 units/year for the last ten
years, much of this vacant housing
Activities funded extensively with CDBG monies
Under the BHP they will rehabilitate 83 units at:
Dixwell
Seaver Street
Minden Street
Day Street
Jess Street
Columbus Avenue
22
IV. Project Financing
Introduction
The Financing structure of the Boston Housing Partnership is
incredibly complex. In essence, the Partnership model aggregates
virtually every available subsidy and financing source into one package.
The financing structure is fundamentally a reaction to the recent
federal cutbacks in deep subsidies (particularly in the Section 8 program)
and therefore should not be viewed as an "ideal" model. Rather, it is an
effort to "piggyback" as many available resources as possible to make
such large-scale rehabilitation efforts possible.
There are two major purported benefits of the "model". First, it
achieves economies of scale. A typical development by a non-profit might
involve as many as ten different funding sources. The costs of structuring
these deals, however, often results in extremely high total project costs.
The Partnership effort, on the other hand arranges public and private
commitments of loan and grant support into one neat package for the ten
sponsors. The second benefit of the financing model is that it allows
the sponsors to devote more of their time to the nitty-gritty issues
involved in the development process (i.e., site selection, project
management, etc.) while the Partnership does the financing arrangements.
The financing structure has been touted by many as a potential "model"
for other cities facing a situation similar to Boston's. In an era
of diminishing resources for housing rehabilitation, such proponents claim,
resources must be pooled and the Partnership offers an innovative
opportunity.
The package, however, is anything but "neat". Several of the sponsors
I interviewed wondered aloud if there really was any "one individual who
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understands how this thing works". Bob Whittlesey, the Partnership
director, claims that there is probably no one individual outside of the
Partnership staff who understands how the deal is structured.
The reasons for this are twofold. First, there are literally dozens
of institutions and individuals involved. Keeping track of the agency
acronyms is itself no small feat. Second, and more crucial, is that the
financing was much more of a "process" than an actual "product" especially
during the early days of the Demonstration Program. Loan and subsidy
commitments from the various funders involved came gradually. Getting
agencies "on board" was an incremental task. While it was possible to
catch a glimpse of the deal at any given point in time, it was highly
likely that the deal would change by the time one took a second look.
More on this later, but for now the critical point is that the process that
built the financing package produced a situation in which not even the
sponsors themselves comprehended the complexity.
Overview
The following is something of a snapshot in time. It describes what
the financial structure of the Demonstration Program looks like as of
early 1985. It is probably safe to assume that much of it is stable
because all of the major actors have given commitments to participate.
There may, however, be additional minor changes.
Four major Banks are the originating construction lenders, led by the
First National Bank of Boston. The Federal National Mortgage Association,
as the permanent loan risk taker, will purchase the mortgages from these
banks on the secondary mortgage market at the end of construction. They
will then issue securities backed by the mortgages. These mortgage-backed
securities will be purchased by the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency
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(MHFA) with the proceeds from a tax-exempt bond issue.
Equity is being raised through syndication. The individual project
tax shelter benefits are being pooled into one large offering and sold to
limited partner investors.
"Front-end" development grants are being funded by the City of Boston
and several foundation sources.
Working capital reserves are being loaned to the Partnership projects
by the Community Development Finance Corporation (CDFC) and the Local
Initiatives Support Corporation (LISC).
Rental Assistance will be provided by the State of Massachusett's
Chapter 707 program and the State Housing Assistance for Rental Production
(SHARP) program. The Section 8 Moderate Rehabilitation Program and Section
8 Certificates in place will also be utilized.
The following sections examine the financing structure in a bit more
detail.
First Mortgage Financing
First Mortgage loans are generated through a particularly complex
arrangement involving participation by four Boston financial institutions
(First National Bank of Boston, Bank of New England, Shawmut Bank of
Boston, and State Street Bank and Trust Company), the Massachusetts
Housing Finance Agency (MHFA) and the Federal National Mortgage
Association (FNMA).
Construction Lending and Loan Origination: The Banks
First mortgage loans will be originated and funded by a consortium of
four major Boston commercial banks (see above). By early April of 1985,
half (5) of the sponsors had either entered into loan closing negotiations
with these banks or had actually closed
25
The loan risk during construction will be born by these originating
lenders -- if the projects go into default during this period, the
defaulted loans will end up in the hands of these banks. The banks role
in assuming this risk is seen by many as a healthy step reflecting their
substantive involvement.
The Bank of Boston is serving as the lead Bank that coordinates the
review work on behalf of these lenders. Each project is reviewed
individually.
Total loans will amount to approximately $17.8 million for the ten
sponsors. The interest rate will be the rate set by the MHFA Multi-Family
Housing Revenue Bonds (around 10.5%) plus fees required to cover FNMA fees
and fees required by the bond documents. (see the section on 4. Bond
Financing: MHFA)
CDBG Build Loan
In addition to the bank's construction loan, $4.5 million will be
provided by the City of Boston through its CD Interim Financing program.
This program provides short term financing at below market rates (3% in
this case) to projects considered to have significant public benefits.
This money, however, is to be drawn from CDBG funds available to the
City. It is expected that the city will want to spend this on other
activities at a later date. The City needed an assurance that if the CDBG
money needed to be recalled early, they could get their money back. State
Street Bank, therefore, provided a $4.5 million letter of credit. The
collateral for the letter of credit was four years of syndication proceeds.
FNMA Loan Purchase Arrangements
The Federal National Mortgage AssociaLion (FNMA) has commited to
purchase the mortgages from the banks at the initial loan closings. FNMA
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will assume the First Mortgages and the banks have made a commitment to
FNMA to repurchase the morgages should the respective projects fail to
reach completion of construction.
In turn, FNMA will issue securities backed by the First Mortgage Notes
purchased. These mortgage backed securities (MBS) will then be purchased
by MHFA, using proceeds from tax-exempt bonds.
FNMA, therefore will assume the permanent lending risk. Each project
must meet their underwriting criteria-and be reviewed individually.
Bond Financing: MHFA
The Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency (MHFA) is a state agency
organized for the purpose of financing housing for low and moderate income
persons and families. They do this by issuing tax-exempt notes and bonds.
Their interest rates on MHFA loans, therefore, are generally below
conventional mortgage rates.
MHFA, after reviewing each project for overall feasibility, issued
a $22.3 million tax-exempt bond offer in December of 1984. The market for
these bonds was assured in advance by the aforementioned banks solicitation
of purchasers among the financial and insurance community in the area.
The MHFA bonds are secured by the Mortgage backed securities issued
by FNMA rather than the loans themselves. The proceeds from these tax-exempt
bonds will be used to purchase the MBS's
This complex mortgage structure is considered advantageous to the
Partnership because it enhances the credit worthiness of the tax-exempt bond
issue. MHFA note and bond issues are normally backed by the moral obligation
of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and receive a A- rating from Standard
and Poors. The multi-tiered purchasing arrangement just described, however,
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allows the bond issue to be rated AAA and therefore results in reduced
financing costs for the projects. Pat Clancy, director of GBCD, estimates
that the bond rate was reduced perhaps 3/4 of a point through this
arrangement which takes advantage of the high credit rating of the FNMA
guarantee.
MHFA bonds bear a variety of interest rates and maturities, but their
blended rates and terms will result in project mortgage interest rates
of 10.5% per year and terms of 21 years.
Equity Financing: Syndication
The Partnership utilized the expertise of GBCD to arrange the equity
financing for all projects by organi.zing a pooled syndication offering.
GBCD was the pioneer in the early 1970's in utilizing tax laws to benefit
developers of low income housing. In short, in a syndication offering,
the tax shelter benefit generated by a project (primarily through
depreciation allowances and interest payments) is sold to a group of
limited partners. These funds are then used as equity.
The major advantage of the pooling of the projects into one financial
package is probably most evident in the syndication offering. Syndication
deals often involve substantial placement fees, financial consulting
fees, and legal fees. Pooling the syndication, however, achieves
significant economies of scale in these costs and fees. Many fees and
costs are relatively fixed in putting together a syndication offering and
large deals are often much more economical. In the long run, this leaves
more money for the limited partners and enhances the marketability to
investors.
In order to raise equity financing, a limited partnership was created
by all of the project sponsors. Each of the non-profit corporations has a
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for-profit subsidiary who serves as the general partners in a limited
partnership. Limited partner investors have been identified by the
syndication placement agent, Summitt Company.
The pooled equity amounts to $8.8 million. A typical unit which has
a development cost of $38,000, therefore, receives approximately $6,700
in syndication payments. Roughly $3,000 in equity funds will be generated
during the development period when projects are being renovated and
achieving full occupancy. The remaining $3,700 will be borrowed during
this period against the receipt of later capital contributions through
1989.
"Front-end" Grants: City of Boston and Foundations
The City of Boston, using CDBG funds of $4.5 million, and three
foundations sources (the Public Welfare Foundation, the Hyams Trust, and
the Mabel G. Riley Foundation), contributing approximately $500,000, have
helped create a $5 million pool of funds to assist in paying development
costs. Because this is a grant, the sponsors do not need to reimburse
the doners.
The Partnership, however, is treating these "grants" as loans to the
non-profit sponsors. The non-profit sponsors will in turn, "loan" these
funds to the limited partnership. This loan will become a second mortgage
on the property. This creative second mortgage increases both the
depreciation and interest deductions available to the limited partners,
thereby enabling additional equity to be raised.
The repayment of this debt from the limited partnership to the non-profit
is largely deferred for fifteen years, so repayment does not increase the
debt burden. At the end of eighteen years, the limited partnership will
owe substantial funds to the community sponsor, which can then use the
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value of these funds to help assure that the further use of the property
continues to meet community needs for affordable housing.
The total amount loaned to each Local Limited Partnership by the
respective non-profit affiliate will be approximately $6,100 per housing
unit.
Working Capital Reserve Funds: CDFC, Ford, and LISC
Capital reserve funds will be created for each project at the initial
loan closings. These working capital funds will total approximately $1.9
million (2,400 per unit) and are expected to be available during construction
for overruns in development costs. If unused, these funds will become
operating reserves to remain in place until one year of breakeven operations.
The working capital reserves are coming from three lending sources:
the Massachusetts Development Finance Corporation (CDFC), the Local
Initiatives Support Corporation (LISC), and the Program Related Investment
Division of the Ford Foundation. CDFC is a quasi-public agency created by
the Massachusetts Legislature to provide loan funds and grants to community
development corporations; LISC is a national organization that provides
loans and grants to community corporations to promote physical and economic
development. These loans will go to the BHP and/or the non-profit
affiliates of each local general partner, which will then loan them to
the Local Limited Partnership. The eighth and ninth syndication payments
will back these working capital loans.
State Housing Assistance for Rental Production (SHARP) Loans
Seven of the nine projects have received commitments from MIRFA for
rental assistance through the State Housing Assistance for Rental
Production (SHARP) program. Projects receiving SHARP commitments will
receive annual payments in the form of interest free loans to subsidize
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the cost of debt service on their permanent financing. SHARP loans are
due and payable at the end of fifteen years or at sale and/or refinancing.
The amount loaned will total approximately $850,00 for fifteen years.
(For more information on SHARP, see section C. under "Rental Assistance
Programs".)
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V. Rental Assistance Programs
Even with the write downs involved in the construction cost, the
resulting unit rents of approximately $500 for a two bedroom unit would be
above the means of most low income families. The projects, therefore,
will receive rental assistance from two federal and two state programs:
the Section 8 Moderate Rehabilitation Program and Existing Housing
Programs, the Chapter 707 Rental Assistance Program, and the SHARP program.
Chapter 707 Rental Assistance Program
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts' Executive Office of Communities and
Development (EOCD) has commited 231 units of Chapter 707 Rental Assistance
to the BHP for allocation to the local limited partnerships.
EOCD will provide annual contributions to an administering agency
(the BHP through initial occupancy and possibly the Boston Housing Authority
afterwards) to provide rental assistance payments to the sponsors 'or
eligible tenants. The tenants rent share may not exceed 25 percent of
household income.
EOCD has agreed to allow rents in assisted projects to be equal to 110%
of the Section 8 Existing Fair Market Rents. Allowable rents are as follows:
0 bedroom units $418
1 bedroom units $482
2 bedroom units $567
3 bedroom units $648
4 bedroom units $777
Chapter 707 subsidies are commited to the buildings and have a contract
term of five years, renewable at the end of each five year term. Income
limits are similar to those used in the Section 8 program. (see below)
Section 8 Housing Assistance
The Section 8 Program, created by the Housing and Community Development
Act of 1974 (which ammended Section 8 of the U.S. Housing Act of 1937)
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originally had several components. The Section 8 programs designed to
facilitate new construction of and substantial rehabilitation of low-income
family housing units has recently been terminated by the Regan Administration.
However, portions of these programs remain intact and two are being utilized
by the BHP -- the Section 8 Moderate Rehabilitation Program and the
Section 8 Existing Housing Program.
The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), in both
programs will pay the sponsors the difference between a federally determined
contract rent and 30% of gross family income. Contract rents generally
may not exceed the "Fair Market Rent" -- the highest rents chargeable in
each market area for unsubsidized, modest rental units. In this case, HUD
has allowed Fair Market rents to be 120% of existing FMR for the Mod Rehab
program, and 110% of existing FMR for the Certificates-in-Place.
HUD requires that 95% of the tenants assisted under these programs fall
within their "very low income" guidelines. Current Section 8 income limits
in Boston are as follows:2 6
Low Income Very Low Income
Family Size (80% of median) (50% of median)
1 person $18,100 $11,300
2 persons $20,700 $12,900
3 persons $23,250 $14,550
4 persons $25,850 $16,150
5 persons $27,450 $17,450
6 persons $29,100 $18,750
7 persons $30,700 $20,050
8 persons $32,300 $21,300
More than 90% of all current beneficiaries of the Section 8 program
fall into the "very low income" category, so it is not expected that this
requirement will affect the program significantly.
Urban Edge has eighteen units of Section 8 Moderate Rehab subsidy.
Dorchester Bay and Mission Hill each have approximately 30. In addition,
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the City of Boston make 100 units available to the Partnership.
Approximately 60 of the households currently occupying units hold
certificates entitling them to receive rental assistance through the
Section 8 Existing Housing Program. In addition, the City made 50 units
of Section 8 Existing Housing Certificates (made available through the
third round of the HUD Rental Rehabilitation Demonstration Program)
available to the BHP.
In total, therefore, the BHP Demonstration Program will have 231
Chapter 707 Ceritifcates, 168 Section 8 Moderate Rehab units, and 110
Existing Section 8 Certificates. In other words, 70% of the units
(509/730) will receive either Section 8 or 707 assitance.
State Housing Assistance For Rental Production
The State Housing Assistance for Rental Production (SHARP) program
is a new state effort enacted in 1983 to stimulate the development of
additional rental housing and ensure that 25% of these units be affordable
to low income households.
The program, administered by MHFA, consists of payments made under a
no-interest loan which subsidizes the cost of mortgage interest payments
to a level no lower than 5 percent for a maximum of fifteen years.
Each local limited partnership will be obligated to repay the full
amount advanced after fifteen years or at sale and/or refinancing. Because
the SHARP legislation requires that proceeds from the repayment of these
loans be used to benefit low and moderate income tenants, owners may be
allowed by MHFA to recycle the loan repayment back into their developments
if such use is necessary to ensure the continued availability of affordable
housing to low and moderate income renters.
Selection of projects was made by MHFA through a competitive funding
34
round, in which the BHP projects competed individually for assistance.
Seven of the ten projects received commitments of SHARP assistance in
August of 1984, with the aggregate of SHARP funds awarded equalling
$850,000 per year.
The seven sponsors who were awarded SHARP funding were Quincy-Geneva,
Lena Park, Mission Hill, Allston-Brighton, Codman Square, Fields Corner,
and Roxbury-North Dorchester. Urban Edge and the Fenway were not selected.
Dorchester Bay did not request SHARP funding because they did not feel that
their project required it. They had all 707 and Section 8 assisted units.
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VI. Implementation
When one asks any of the BHP program designers or participants to
describe the program, one is bound to hear the word "COMPLEX" mentioned.
Marvin Siflinger, director of M4HFA has "seen nothing this complex in all
my years in the housing business". Pat Clancy, director of GBCD and
principal planner of the project financing, claims that while he realized
it would be complicated "as the program unfolded, the complexity
originally envisioned doubled". To attempt to tell the entire story
surrounding the implementation therefore, would be impossible. Instead,
the following section will highlight some of the more significant factors
that unfolded between late 1983 and early 1985 to shape the project
outcome.
Getting the Banks to Play
One of the major battles of the Partnership, as might be expected, was
getting the Banks to actively participate in the financing. While it was
clear that Edgerly was a prime mover behind the Partnership, it was less
clear what that meant in financial terms.
The first attempt at defining the financial package, came from the city.
A December 1982 memo from NDEA laid out the initial program design. Among
other things, it assumed that first mortgage financing would be provided
through a tax-exempt bond issue - purchased by the Banks. These bonds
would carry a 40 year term and a below market, fixed rate. As Bonnie
Heudorfer, the Partnership's first executive director noted: "The plan was
a dream. The Banks rejected it immediately". Heudorfer pointed out that
banks generally do not need tax-exempt income of this sort. In. fact, no
institution wants to have a large amount of tax-exempt paper from a single
financing in their portfolio. Bankers are also wary of holding long term,
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fixed rate notes (particularly below market). With the first city-initiated
attempt rejected, it was back to the drawing board.
The second attempt came primarily from GBCD. They envisioned MHFA or
CDFC doing the first mortgage financing with revenue bonds. The bond issue
was to be credit enhanced by a letter of credit from the Bank of Boston.
The banks rejected this also. As Heudorfer recalls: "they didn't like it.
It was something that hadn't been done before and they felt it was too
complicated". It was back to the drawing board again, but this time, a
significant shift occured that would have a great impact on the final
product.
It was becoming clear to Edgerly and Clancy that the banks would never
actively participate in the financing unless they were more involved in
planning their own role. The major stumbling block, up to this point, it
was felt, was that the program was perceived as "just another city program".
As Heudorfer points out, "although NDEA had originated the idea, it became
clear that we would need to orchestrate this to look like the city wasn't
calling the shots". The success of the Partnership, it was felt would
hinge on whether the banks would provide financing. To get them involved,
"they had to feel like it was their program, not the city's". The
Partnership, therefore, turned to the banks for an active proposal.
The first thing that happened was that the Banks expressed their dismay
at the RFP. By January of 1983, the RFP was well on its way to completion,
despite the fact that no solid financing arrangement had been agreed upon.
They decided to halt the RFP from being sent out until the financing
structure solidified. Second, they began to offer their own suggestions.
The Bank of New England had been particularly reluctant to participate
in the previously mentioned schemes. The suggestion that FNMA buy the
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permanent mortgages came from them. If FNMA would hold the permanent
mortgages, thebank's risk could be limited to construction. FNMA could
also provide the credit enhancement to the bond issue. As mentioned, the
final financing package involved this tripartite arrangement between the
banks, FNMA, and MHFA.
Getting FNMA to Play
Getting FNMA to agree, however, was extremely difficult. Heudorfer
described FNMA as the biggest stumbling block the Partnership had to hurdle.
They were very slow to agree to the financing for a number of reasons.
First, they were the only member of the Partnership who were "outsiders".
They were not involved on the Partnership board and had little if any
local presence. Communication, therefore, was time consuming. The
Partnership communicated primarily through FNMA's Community Development
Department, who according to Heudorfer "were looking for a project that
could help them justify their existence". While this department seemed
cooperative, others at FNMA were less so. Heudorfer recalls when the
FNMA appraisers arrived in Boston; "after touring the individual projects,
they were shocked. They don't normally do deals like this". While their
CD Department had given earlier indications to the Partnership that they
would participate, "when the appraisers saw the building conditions and
locations, their jaws dropped". FNMA was in the end, committed, but
extremely cautious.
CDBG Build Loan
As mentioned earlier, the City of Boston agreed to give the Partnership
a low interest loan $4.5 million in addition to the CDBG grant money of
$4.5 million. The "Build" loan, however, was not without strings. The
money is coming out of a pot of unused federal money that the city might
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want back to use in other CDBG projects. As Bob Whittelsey notes;
"this means that the city can recall this money at any time". The
Partnership, therefore had to assure the City that they would, in fact,
return the money if necessary. The Partnership turned to the banks for
this assurance. Bob Whittelsey had to convince the Bank of Boston that
the banks should issue a letter of credit backing the loan. The letter
of credit would be secured by the future syndication payments.
Needless to say, the banks were reluctant once again. If the program
failed, there would be no- future syndication payments and they'd be out
$5 million. By this time, however, the program had begun to roll. Sponsors
were well on the way in preparing work estimates, and many had purchased
buildings when their option agreements expired, because they felt the
program would work if the banks were behind it. The pressure on the Bank
of Boston was enough to force them to agree to a rather risky arrangement,
but not without concessions from the Partnership.
As Bob Whittlesey notes; "the complexity and costs involved in arranging
this particular arrangement were unbelievable. As you might imagine, we
did lots of lawyering back and forth over this one". Such "lawyering", of
course, is both time consuming and costly. The banks agreed to the letter
of credit but spent a lot of time attempting to limit their liability. For
example, the Bank wanted a $1 million dollar cash guarantee from the
Partnership in case of project default. At some point, the "lawyering
around" became senseless -- as Whittlesey noted; "I kept telling them,
all I've got is this rented office, a typewriter, and a computer. You
can have it, but it ain't worth a million dollars".
SHARP Subsidies
Another stumbling block for the Partnership was the SHARP subsidy
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program. This too proved more time consuming than was originally
anticipated. Pat Clancy had served on the Governor's Task Force on
Housing that had worked to put together the SHARP program. He was well
aware that the program could be very useful to the Partnership projects.
Although EOCD had agreed to set-aside of Chapter 707 subsidies, MHFA did
not agree to a set-aside for SHARP. CDC's therefore had to participate
in a competitive process for SHARP assistance.
The SHARP program was new in 1984 and was delayed twice. First,
legilsation creating SHARP took longer than expected to pass. Second,
MHFA was in charge of putting together the guidelines and this also took
additional time. It was not until March of 1984 that sponsors were
notified that they would have to compete for SHARP. Applications were due
May 31 and decisions were made August 15.
The mortgage applications, which were to be submitted to MHFA had to
wait until the SHARP awards were made because many of the projects'
feasibility would be uncertain without them.
MHFA and Prevailing Wages
The tripartite financing arrangement also brought in MHFA as the bond
issuer. This move triggered the requirements of the federal Davis Bacon
Act. "Prevailing wages", which average $20-$25 per hour, were to be paid
in all project rehabilitation work.
The original Descriptive Materials issued in February of 1983 and the
August 1983 RFP both assumed that small independent contractors would
perform the work at wages in the $15 per hour range.
In January of 1984, the sponsors selected were called to a meeting at
which they were informed of the prevailing wage law. The effects on
sponsor projects will be evaluated in the next section, but for now, the
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important point is that MHFA's involvement added another level of
"complexity" that was unanticipated.
To understand how the Partnership unfolded over the last two years, it
is critical to understand that the financial resources necessary to carry
out the Demonstration Program were not in place at the time implementation
began. The RFP, issued in August of 1983, noted that "the financial
arrangements described here are preliminary ones. The Partnership has
discussed them with agencies and institutions whose support is sought, but
firm commitments have not yet been obtained".
The original timetable issued with the RFP had projects beginning
construction by February-June 1984. All lender reviews and commitments,
it was hoped, would be completed by May of 1984. As of April, 1985, however,
half (5) of the projects had still not closed.
The Effect on the Sponsors
The problems encountered by the community based sponsors was probably
best captured by Ed Burke, President of the Fenway Civic Association, and
Board member of the Fenway CDC; "The diver was on the diving board but
they hadn't decided where to put the pool". In short, the program was
being designed as the sponsors were putting together their individual
projects.
We have looked at some of the problems which arose in coordinating the
various actors involved in the Partnership, particularly financing sources.
This section will examine what the effects of that process were on the
community based sponosrs.
Site Control
One issue that was nearly universally problematic was maintaining site
control. The sponsors were required to submit evidence of site control in
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their applications. Approximately 12% of the buildings were under
purchase and sale, 44% were under option, 14% were bound through a
letter of agreement, and 26% were either in the foreclosure process or
the deed was being cleared. 2 7
The original options and Purchase and Sale agreements ran through
January of 1984. Upon acceptance into the Partnership, however, most of the
sponsors were able to receive further extensions through August. Because
the timetable in the RFP had Lender commitments finalized by June of 1984,
most felt comfortable with such an arrangement.
When options began expiring around August of 1984, however, panic struck
many of the sponsors. Many sponsors were put into an uncomfortable
position of having to decide whether to purchase the building prior to
commitment of subsidies and mortgage loans. They would then be forced to
manage these buildings earlier than anticipated without the resources to
bring them up to code.
In the end, many of the sponsors did, in fact, buy their buildings that
were privately owned because the owners refused to extend their options
month after month. As many sponsors recalled, owners got tired of hearing
"just one more month".
This situation, however, was not without complications. Serious internal
organizational issues were raised for sponsors. Kathy Wermiak, director of
the Fields Corner CDC characterized the dilemma; "There was a real fear
that if the Partnership failed to deliver, we'd be stuck and perceived as
another slumlord. We didn't want to acquire any of the buildings until
things solidified".
In the end, these "organizational" concerns were solved through
necessity. Many sponsors had no choice. It was either buy the buildings
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or lose them. Thealatter option was also unacceptable because it too
conflicted with the organizational goals of the CDC's -- preserving decent,
affordable housing. Many of these buildings would have been lost to
further deterioration and eventual abandonment, or conversely, to
speculation and drastic rent increases.
The Fenway CDC was forced to buy their only building in July of 1984.
The Partnership helped finance this purchase and several others. Tenant
rents pay the interest on this lean but there is nothing left over.
Sharon Riley, of Roxbury-North Dorchester had a typical story to tell. One
of the buildings they were forced to buy in September of 1984 had been
rapidly deteriorating and the owner was not doing any repairs. They
purchased the building -- just in time for the boiler to need replacing.
Quincy Geneva also had a property with a broken boiler and needed a
Partnership loan to get through the winter.
For CDC's with City owned buildings, similar problems occurred. Codman
Square CDC was preparing a rehabilitation plan for one of two city owned
buildings. They were hoping to complete rehabilitation before the winter
because they feared the pipes might break if they froze. In the end, the
financing was not finalized, the CDC could not afford to rehab the
building on their own, and the pipes did break. The result on their
overall project has been major. Their closing date has been moved up to
May 17, which Bill Jones, director, called "a highly optimistic date".
In the meantime, they are reworking their project to exclude this building.
Contractor Problems
Six of the nine sponsors interviewed had significant problems with their
contractors. First, five of the sponsors (Allston-Brighton, Codman Square,
Fenway, and Quincy Geneva, and Dorchester Bay) were forced to switch the
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original contractor within the first few months of the program. There
were two reasons for this. First, as mentioned, sponsors were not
informed that they would be required to pay prevailing wages until after
their projects were selected. This change required changing specs, work
write-ups, etc., and often resulted in a contractor change. Second, the
Partnership required that the contractors be able to provide performance
bonds for 100% of the value of the work to be performed. This too
presented some problems. Ma-ny did not learn that their contractor was
not bondable until early 1984. In the search for a bondable contractor
who could also bid near the original contractor, many came up short.
Jim Luckett, of the Dorchester Bay EDC summed up the contractor
problem; "The Partnership envisioned that we'd use middle range contractors.
They would be big enough to get a 100% performance bond, deal with all
the paperwork and regulations, minority hiring, Davis Bacon.. .but at the
same time they were supposed to be small enough to take on the trouble of
doing partial rehab with tenants in place, different locations...In the end
we found that this 'middle' range contractor doesn't exist."
The experience of many other sponsors confirms this observation. Matt
Thall, of the Fenway CDC estimates that the requirements (particulary the
bond requirement) eliminates 60% of the contractors who might take on such
a job. As of early April, the Fenway CDC was still without a contractor.
For some sponsors, contractors simply backed out. Many of the small
contractors found that they couldn't wait month after month for the
Partnership to finalize the projects. Many were too small and didn't have
enough flexibility to work around the delayed timetable.
Problems with contractors were compounded after December of 1984 because
sponsors were then locked into a mortgage amount. They had already
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submitted mortgage documents to MHFA using their present "best bid"
contractor prices. If they lost their contractor after this date, they
were in a double jam. Not only did they have to find a new contractor,
but they had to get them to work at or below the level of the previous
bid.
The sponsors found two ways around this dilemma. First some altered
the amount of rehab to be done -- doing less for the same price. Others
tried to save money by circumventing the prevailing wage requirement. At
least two CDC's bought their buildings and started some non prevailing-wage
work with small contractors (non-bondable) to reduce the amount of work to
be done by the Partnership contractor.
The roots of the contractor problem go back as early as December of 1983.
Just before Christmas, GBCD informed the sponsors of a provision in Section
167K of the IRS code. This statute allowed sponsors to write off $5,000
in per unit rehab costs over 5 years (rather than 15) if low income tenants
(below 80% of the median) inhabited the units. The:provision, however, was
set to expire on January 1, 1984. GBCD, therefore required the sponsors to
have their contractors signed within one week. As more than one sponsor
reported, this resulted in "bogus cost estimates created to enhance the
syndication proceeds". Sponsors were assured that they would not be
locked into these situations and, in fact, they were not. However, the
cost estimates were nevertheless used as a guidepost by many sponsors.
With construction contracts in hand at reasonable prices, a false sense
of security was found. When these contractors left the picture and more
realistic cost estimates arrived, many were shocked at the actual expenses.
Changes in Per Unit Costs
As we have seen, the number of different actors involved in the
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BHP MULTI-FAMILY PROGRAM
Changes to Projected Per Unit Costs
Number of Units
Feb. 83
Initial
Descriptive
Materials
1. Acquisition and Rehab
2. Construction Loan
Interest
3. Financing Fees
4. Other Development
Costs
5. Reserves
TOTALS
Source: This information was obtained from a BHP memo made available to me by Bob Whittlesey, director.
500
4:-
$25,000
1,021
850
2,970
3,000
500
Aug. 83
Request
for
Proposals
$26,000
1,244
950
3,650
5,000
$36,844
800
Jan. 84
Revised
Expanded
Budget
$29,430
1,100
1,000
3,500
3,250
$38,280
700
Jan. 85
Closing
Budgets
$33,221
2,327
6,693
5.323
5,993
$53,557$32,841
Partnership financing scheme, involved numerous complications that extended
the timetable of the Partnership. A second effect of this complexity was
felt in the per unit costs of the sponsors projects. Table 1 shows the
Changes in Per Unit Costs to the sponsors projects from February of
1983 through January of 1985. As shown, the total per unit costs
skyrocketed -- from $32,841 to $53,557 -- an increase of 64%. Several
factors account for such a rise, but most of them I would argue, are a
result of the unforseen complexity that this effort involved. The
following section will explain where these increases came from.
Acquisition and rehab increased $8,221. About half of that can be
explained by MHFA's participation in the financing scheme. As we have
seen, MHFA required that "prevailing wages" be paid. The effect of this
change,since labor represents about 50% of the rehab construction budget,
was to increase construction costs an average of 15%, or approximately
$3,000 per unit. These higher labor costs, in turn caused some changes
in the original specifications. This contributed to a further increase
of $1,000 per unit. As mentioned, when the sponsors were notified of
MHFA's requirement in January, it was back to the drawing board. The
cost -- $4,000 per unit.
The remaining increase ($4,000) can be explained, but less systematically.
Several reasons seem to exist. First, the extended timetable resulted in
extended options payments, some of which were not recoverable against the
pruchase price. This does not seem to be the major reason, however.
The more significant factor was offered by Jim Luckett, of Dorchester
Bay; "most of us assumed that the 'better buildings' were going to be
cheaper to rehabilitate. We realized later, however, that they too were
expensive". Many CDC's has followed a strategy of "cross-subsidization".
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To get severely detiorated buildings into the package and remain within
the dollar limits set by the Partnership ($26,000) many tried to combine
abandoned buildings with properties needing very little work. As most
found out, "very little work" cost more than anticipated. The "paint and
touch-up" buildings were both few and far between and had prohibitively
high acquisition prices when they could be found. The result was very
little cross-subsidization (only around 20% of the Partnership properties
are actually abandoned), and higher than expected rehab costs on "better
buildings."
The highest increase in costs, and for our purposes the most
interesting, is the increase in financing fees. Financing fees saw an
astronomical leap. These numbers reflect a lot of the difficulties
encountered in coordinating the various financing agencies. Note that
fees went from $850 to $6,693 per unit -- an increase of 687 percent.
Many of the problems associated with the Partnership effort were not
simply timetable problems. They resulted in significant increases in
costs which raise some serious questions about the wisdom of such an
approach.
How can a 687% increase be accounted for? According to Bob Whittlesey,
all but the closing budgets assumed only 3.5% financing fees. In other
words, as late as January of 1984, the Partnership felt that they could
coordinate the various actors involved without paying astronomical legal
fees and other associated "soft" costs. I would argue that most of
these expenses were a direct result of the overly-complex "tripartite"
agreement between the Banks, FNMA, and MHFA.
Of the $5,693 in financing fees, approximately $1,514 was a result of
the bond issue. As Bob Whittlesey, notes one of the very unique things
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about the BHP is that they essentially have their own bond issue; "in
effect that means that I operate MHFA's system". The Partnership is
performing the role that MHFA normally plays, namely distributing
mortgage funds across a number of different projects. The result of this
arrangement, however, has been very costly. MHFA bond counsel, for
example, received over $550,000. MHFA, FNMA, and Bank counsel fees,
for the bond issue only -- was $813,000. In addition, the rating agency
required capitalized interest of $247,000. This is excess money to assure
timely bond payments with a potential lag in mortgage payments.
In my interviews with the non-profits, many of them complained about
the astronomical fees, particularly legal, that the financing structure
involved. Shelly Hoon, consultant to Quincy-Geneva noted; "legal fees have
been astronomical because everyone involved seemed to want a legal opinion
on everything that happened". The result for most sponsors, was that one
move by any of the three participants in the tripartite financial arrangement
would trigger a move by the others to produce a legal opinion.
Bob Whittlesey notes the distinct difference between the Partnership
effort and earlier efforts to provide low income housing; "The closings
we did years ago were done with myself, my lawyer, the feds, and their
lawyer. We did everything in the HUD area office. Now we do the loan
closings in private legal offices and there's not a sign of the feds
anywhere." The result, notes Bob, has not been easy. "We've got seventeen
law firms involved in this deal." This in part, accounts for a
significant portion of the 687% increase.
A typical letter of commitment from the Bank of Boston to the CDC's for
example, was a one page cover letter describing the amount, term, interest
rate, commitment fee, and servicing fee. "Additional provisions", however,
49
were almost always attached. A typical list of provisions would be ten
pages long and include 25 separate points.
Dan Oulette, who coordinated the Bank of Boston's participation in the
Partnership notes that bank knew it would be complicated when they
entered the deal, but not as complicated as it turned out. The bank has
had to deal with close to 100 individuals to package this deal. He notes
that their underwriting criteria were stretched considerably and that
this always takes time and money.
As mentioned earlier, the Bank of Boston provided a letter of credit
to the City of Boston, assuring that they would back the Partnership's
promise to return $5.5 million on CDBG money, if necessary. This too
proved costly to the Partnership. The letter of credit charge (plus
interest on this loan and working capital loans) totals $1,105,000.
Syndication expenses also were high. Placement fees, legal, accounting
consulting, management and servicing fees, accounted for $1,656,000
of the total project costs.
The above items account for the 687% increase in financing fees
that the Partnership projects had to absorb. The result has been that
the Partnership will end up paying approximately 20% for financing fees
rather than the anticipated 3.5%. I would argue that such a figure must
must call into question the wisdom of the tripartite financing
arrangement.
The "complexity" of the Partnership's financing arrangement was
an ingenious attempt to pool many shallow subsidy mechanisms into one
package. Such innovation appears to be unmatched elsewhere in the
country. Pat Clancy, in particular, was critical to the success of that
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effort, and indeed, his ability to bring the financing sources together,
with Edgerly's assistance, was nothing short of brilliant.
The end, result, however, should be carefully scrutinized. As we
have seen, the effort involved a large number of actors, each with a
different interest and agenda. Getting these interests to act in
consort, particularly FNMA and the banks, was a difficult task that
significantly extended the timetable of the Partnership's demonstration
program. The complexity of the coordination effort also resulted in
extremely high per unit cost increases, particularly in the area of
financing fees. These astronomical (yet unforeseen) fees reveal a
great deal about the Partnership's effort to "piggyback" the numerous
sources of assistance.
In essence, the piggy-backing of multiple assistance programs
geometrically increased the efforts necessary to coordinate the roles
between the various actors. As at least one observer has noted, the
Partnership financing model "contains a rather hefty surcharge for
complexity." x One critic has called the arrangement "the Cadillac
model, funding three piece suits". x
Another significant increase was found in "Other Development
Costs". Note that these rose from $2,970 to $5,323 per unit -- an
increase of 79%. Most of this can be accounted for directly by the
extended timeline and the effect that that had on the sponsors. As
we have seen, many sponsors were forced to purchase buildings early.
For many that resulted in unbudgeted expenses for managemen and
maintainence. Most of these expenses exceeded interim operating income
(rents) and had to be added to their development costs. These early
management and maintainence expenses added $1,500 per unit (on average)
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to each of the sponsors projects. The additional increase ($800 per
unit) constitute an increase in professional fees and incidental
costs that were not accounted for in initial budgets because they
underestimated the amount of work to be done by lawyers,
architects, etc.
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Conclusion
The retreat of the federal government from the housing assistance
sector is only beginning to be felt in areas such as Boston. We
should expect the rental housing crisis here to continue despite the
efforts of groups such as the Boston Housing Partnership. Without
a major shift in federal governmental support for housing assistance
the goal of delivering the required number of affordable rental units
for the 1980's will not be met.
Nevertheless, the Partnership effort is impressive. Clancy,
Edgerly, and Whittlesey, in particular, have been especially noteworthy
in providing direction. It is doubtful, for example, if the syndication
deal could have sold without Clancy's expertise, and Edgerly's leadership.
As of late April, 1985, it appears that the Demonstration program may
soon be completed. In spite of severe cost overruns and extended
timetables, the Partnership will accomplish their first mission.
The retreat of the federal government from many social programs has
been accompanied by a recent upsurge in "public-private partnership"
discussions. Some is nothing more than rhetoric, breathing new life
into what is after all, not fundamentally a new idea. The federal
government has always accomplished its public sector housing goals
by utilizing the private sector. The significant shift this time around
is that the feds are now out of the picture. Other "public-private"
efforts have involved more substantive efforts, such as the Boston
Housing Partnership.
Based on the experience of the Boston Housing Partnership, what
might we expect from these efforts? What are the lessons to be learned
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from the Demonstration program?
First, these efforts are generally incredibly complex because they
involve a large number of actors and institutions. To compound matters,
when these actors and institutions have different goals and interests,
coordination is even more cumbersome. The BHP's first effort has
involved five mortgages, the City of Boston, four major Boston Banks,
MHFA, FNMA, the State of Massachusetts, CDFC, LISC, FORD, several i
foundations, limited partners, ten community based housing sponsors,
and seventeen law firms. Often coordination within these institutions
themselves was difficult. FNMA, for example, found their community
development department at odds with other departments. The City's
NDEA found that although they supported the program, getting
Inspectional Services and Public Facilities to move as one was an
extremely difficult task. The very nature of "partnership" efforts often
involve this complexity, and as a result, the coordination process is
bound to be slow and painful, if it is to succeed at all.
Second, these "public-private" efforts are often pioneering new
ground. The result is that these efforts often involve a form of
"conditional" planning. The Catch 22 in "conditional" planning occurs
when no one insitution or individual will agree to act unless the others
have already done so. Such planning efforts, however, are extremely
time consuming and require protracted negotiations between the players
involved.
Third, the difficulties in coordinating these "partnership" efforts
are likely to be not simply time consuming, but costly as well.
Particularly in development related work, time is money and extended
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timetables often result in increased costs. This indeed was the case
with the Partnership's Demonstration program, as we have seen. In
particular, the Partnership encountered a great deal of difficulty in
getting the tripartite mortgage financers to agree on a number of
substantive issues. As at least one observer has noted, the
Partnership played with a lot of "funny money". In the final analysis,
however, they paid an excessive fee for their financing -- 20%. These
cost overruns were a direct result of the difficulties encountered in
coordinating the efforts of the banks, FNMA, and MHFA. Future
'"partnership" efforts should be wary of similar problems.
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The following pages are missing from the
original
List of Interviews
Name
Rebecca Black
Bonnie Heudorfer
Tim Pattison
Jim Luckett.
Matt Thall
Kathy Wermiak
Sharon Riley
Shelly Hoon
Bill Jones
Jim Hoffman
Othello Mahone
Bob Whittlesey
Dan Oulette
Organization
Allston-Brighton CDC
Bank of Boston
NDEA (formerly)
Dorchester Bay ECD
Fenway CDC
Fields Corner CDC
Roxbury-North Dorchester
Quincy-Geneva
Codman Square
Mission Hill
Lena Park
BHP
Bank of Boston
Date
November 1984
November 1984
December 1984
March 1985
March 1985
April 1985
April 1985
April 1985
April 1985
April 1985
April 1985
April 1985
May 1985
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Initial Multi-Family Program
f Apartment Units
Project Name
Hano Street
Codman Square
Dorchester Bay
Westland Avenue
Fields Corner
Lena Park
Frawley-DaLLe
Quincy/Geneve
Washington Park
Infilt-OixweLL
Seaver Street
Minden Street
Day Street
Jess Street
Columbus Avenue
Subtotal U.E.
TOTAL
Sponsor
Atlaton-Brighton CDC
Codman Square l0C
Dorchester Bay EDOC
Fenway CDC
Fields Corner CDC
Lana Park CDC
Mission Hill NHS
Quincy-Geneva HC
Roxbury-N. Dorchester NRC
Urban
Urban
Urban
Urban
Urban
Urban
Edge
Edge
Edge
Edge
Edge
Edge
Communi ty
Allston
Dorchester
Dorchester
Fenway
Dorchester
N.Dorch/Mattapan
Mission Hill
Rox/N.Dorchestar
Roxbury
Boston
Roxbury
Jamaica
Jamaica
Jamaica
Jamaica
Plain
Plain
Plain
Plain
0 Apts
20
80
58
20
76
93 4
74
101-
96
Sq .Ft.
Apt a
16,000
204,550
49,885
17,280
78,136
124,146
76,830
85,345
110,973
52 56,200
6 5,100
6 7,900
6 11,868
6 5,700
6 8,100
82 94,868
700 858,013
Sq.Ft.
Comm' L
3,700
1,490
3,565
1,500
Studio 1-BR 2-BR
10
24
16 33
1' 8 11
30 29
19 30
32 18
35 29
27 35
6
6
0
10,255
0
1
12
179
3-BR
10
51
9
13
39
9
20
23
4--BR f Btdgs
1
5 12
5
1
4 6
5 11
15 5
17 10
11 6
23 17 a 6
2 4 2
1 3 2 1
6 1
1 3 2 2
33 27 10 13
252 201 67 70
Distibution of Apartment Types 100.0% 0.1% 25.6% 36.0% 28.7% 9.6%
Sponsor
AlLston-Brighton Community Development Corporation
Codman Square Housing Development Corporation
Dorchester Bay Economic Development Corporation
Fenw;y Community Development Corporation
Fields Corner Community Development Corporation
Lena Park Community Development Corporation
Mission Hill Neighborhood Housing Services, Inc.
Quincy-Ceneva Housing Corporation
Anwhiaru-North nnrehAtr i Rrav1nitniiatinn Corn.
sF-
T41h bUt) I UiN llU U ZLN 0 APiN £NIxrlirlJU nk.
OFFICERS
January, 1985
Chairman
William S. Edgerly
Chairman and President
State Street Bank and Trust Co.
225 Franklin Street
Boston, Massachusetts 02101
President
David A. Spina
Executive Vice President & Treasurer
State Street Bank and Trust Co.
225 Franklin Street
Boston, Massachusetts 02101
Clerk
Charles R. Lightner
Vice President - Property Development
Prudential Insurance Company
Boston, Massachusetts 02199
Treasurer
James S. Sweeney
Vice President
Bank of New England
28 State Street
Boston, Massachusetts 02106
Assistant Treasurer
Laura L. Schaefer
Mortgage Loan Officer
Shawmut Bank
One Federal Street
Boston, Massachusetts 02211
Executive Director
Robert B. Whittlesey
Boston Housing Partnership, Inc.
106 Bedford Street
Boston, Massachusetts 02111
106 Bedford Street, Boston, Massachusetts 02111 -617) 423-1221
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BOARb OF DIRECTORS
January, 1985
Robert L. Beal
Executive Vice President
The Beal Companies
15 Broad Street
Boston, Massachusetts 02109
John F. Bok, Esq.
Csaplar & Bok
One Winthrop Square
Boston, Massachusetts 02109
Stephen L. Brown
Executive Vice President
John Hancock Mutual Life Ins.
John Hancock Tower
P.O. Box 111
Boston, Massachusetts 02117
Doris Bunte
Administrator
Boston Housing Authority
52 Chauncy Street
Boston, Massachusetts 02111
Patrick Clancy
Executive Director
Greater Boston Community
Development, Inc.
79 Milk Street
Boston, Massachusetts 02109
Paul S. Grogan
Director
Neighborhood Development and
Employment Agency
15 Beacon Street
Boston, Massachusetts 02108
Ronald T. Hafer
Executive Director
Urban Edge, Inc.
620 Centre Street
Boston, Massachusetts 02130
Co. John P. Hamill
President
Shawmut Corporation
One Federal Street
Boston, Massachusetts
Jorge Hernandez
Executive Director
Inguilinos Boricuas en
475 Shawmut Avenue
Boston, Massachusetts
Frank Jones
President
The Boston Committee
92 State Street
Boston, Massachusetts
02211
Accion
02118
02109
Patrick Cooke
Living in Dorchester, Inc.
10 Brent Street
Dorchester, Massachusetts 02124
Stephen F. coyle
Director
Boston Redevelopment Authority
1 City Hall Square
Boston, Massachusetts 02201
William S. Edgerly
Chairman and President
State Street Bank and Trust Co.
225 Franklin Street
Boston, Massachusetts 02101
Hubert Jones
Dean of Social Work
Boston University
264 Bay State Road
Boston, Massacnusetts
William H. Jones
Executive Director
Codman Square Housing
ment Corporation
6 Norfolk Street
Boston, Massachusetts
02215
Develop-
02124
Robert G. Lee
President
First American Bank for Savings
572 Columbia Road
Boston, Massachusetts 02125
106 Bedford Sreet, Boston, Massachusetts 02111 - (617) 423-1221
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BOARD OF DIRECTORS
Page Two
William F. McCall, Jr.
President & Director
Leggat, McCall & Werner, Inc.
60 State Street
Boston, Massachusetts 02109
Peter H. McCormick
Chairman & Chief Exec. Officer
Bank of New England
28 State Street
Boston, Massachusetts 02106
Edwin B. Morris, III
Executive Vice President
Bank of Boston
100 Federal Street
Boston, Massachusetts 02108
Lowell Richards
Cabot, Cabot & Forbes
60 state Street
Boston, Massachusetts 02109
Marvin Siflinger
Executive Director
Massachusetts Housing Finance
.Agency
50 Milk Street
Boston, Massachusetts 02109
Jeffrey A..Simon
Executive Director
Massachusetts Government Land
Bank
6 Beacon Street, Suite 900
Boston, Massachusetts 02109
Lewis H. Spence
Carpenter & Company
175 Federal Street, Suite 500
Boston, Massachusetts 02110
Keith G. Willoughby
President
Mutual Bank for Savings
45 Franklin Street
Boston, Massachusetts 02110
64
I
BOSTON HOUSING
PARTNERSHIP
1 Allston-Brighton Community Development Corporation
2 Fenway Community Development Corporation
3 Mission Hill Neighborhood Housing Services, Inc.
4 Urban Edge of Greater Boston, Inc.
5 Roxbury/North Dorchester Neighborhood
Revitalzation Corporation
6 Quincy-Geneva Housing Corporation/
Roxbury Multi-Service Center
7 Dorchester Bay Economic Development Corporation
8 Fields Corner Community Development Corporation
9 Codman Square Housing Development Corporation
10 Lena Park Community Development Corporation
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